entschlossenen Denker durch das gefährliche Aussehen desselben nicht erschrecken; was ihm widerspricht, ist falsch, und muss aufgegeben werden, und wenn die Achse des
Erdballs darin zu laufen schiene.") In order to demonstrate this thesis, which seems unlikely considering the state of commentary on Fichte, I will first summarize Fichte"s arguments against the moral philosophy of Kant, then analyze the deduction of the moral law with which Fichte challenges Kant, then finally assess several concrete effects to come out of the reformulation of Kant"s moral law.
THE INADEQUACIES OF KANT"S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Once the dust has settled, what, fundamentally, does Fichte"s pages-long criticism of Kant"s moral philosophy come down to? Fichte criticizes Kant"s failure to demonstrate claims, to satisfy the "need of science" or of "grounded knowledge". Kant most certainly wished to found ethical judgments in reason, but did not manage to do so.
For two presuppositions hinder Kant"s moral philosophy, according to Fichte. On one hand, Kant"s ethics is founded on an induction-a demonstration, which cannot possibly be acceptable in philosophy. On the other hand, Kant"s moral philosophy is irrational in that it presupposes a "dark region of sundry, irrational enthusiasm", where the categorical imperative turns out to be a veritable "occult quality"
1 . Let us now consider these two arguments against Kant in order to understand the task that Fichte undertakes in his ethics. a) Kant did not go so far as to prove the universality of the law, but stopped short at the claim that every man, even the most hardened of criminals, is conscious of the moral law. Kant presumes that one"s humanity distinguishes good from evil a priori.
Kantian ethics rests on a simple induction founded on "self-observation". In fact, in the Kant defines what he means by the expression "practical principles". If these principles are subjective, then they are maxims; if they are cognized as objective, "that is, as holding for the will of every rational being", then they are practical laws. Theorems 1 and 2, as well as the accompanying remarks, are dedicated to showing that, since subjective principles presuppose a determining object, they cannot possibly be considered laws. The following passage proceeds by negating the predicates of these principles to arrive at what must be the practical law: "all that remains of a law if one separates from it everything material…is the mere form of giving universal law". This analysis casts even more doubt on the notion of a Fichte who would have supposedly embraced Kantian doctrine because it limited the claims of knowledge in having to accommodate both the possibility of an ethics and an evaluation of moral actions. Fichte"s goal is not to promote ethical concerns at all costs and under any condition, but rather to determine whether or not a discipline that lays claim to truth can take on that claim and legitimize it. When, as philosophers, we say that such and such an action is unacceptable, we lay claim to the validity of this judgment. Quid juris? It is possible that, along with Hume and many others, we have no other choice but to answer this question by saying that we make such a judgment out of habit or on account of particular customs of a given society.
It is worth insisting on this point, as the distinctive character (focus) of philosophical questioning is itself at issue. A certain interpretation of Fichte has led to a veritable "moralisation" of his philosophical statements. Either Fichte"s initial ethical concern will be overemphasized or else his grounding of theory in practice will be overinterpreted as sheer expression of an obsession with moral philosophy. However, Fichte never challenges a philosophical statement on the basis of its being morally questionable, politically incorrect or legally suspect; he challenges philosophical statements when he deems it within his power to demonstrate that they are inherently false. A necessary prerequisite for founding theory on practice is defining the essence of knowledge in exact terms. What is this new essence of knowledge that claims to ground ethical as well as theoretical judgments in reason? That is the question. If one does not wish to blunt the radical edge of philosophical questioning and divert the latter from its destination, we must entertain the possibility-"with freedom and that according to the truth" -that our value judgments do not possess any sort of validity. Since, in philosophy, it is before all else a question of what is true and false, our moral judgments, like all judgements, must be able to substantiate their claim to truth and not become unquestioned standards by which to evaluate any judgment or philosophical position. Grounding ethics in reason is exactly what The System of Ethics sets out to achieve.
THE DEDUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY
Following the two preceding Wissenschaftslehre (1794 and 1798), we obtain two processes or series: the process of representing the world of the senses as an extension of the finite into the infinite and, conversely, the process of reflection as a finite determination of the infinite. Due to the failure to find an immediate cause of infinite activity, the latter of these processes terminates in exclusion (I am summarizing the first paragraphs of the 1798 doctrine) 5 . From this exclusion arises the necessity to posit a world other than the world of the senses, a world of pure will. This pure will, expression of the infinite, should be given finite expression, determined. Like all assertions in the Wissenschaftslehre, this determination of the infinite obeys the law of reflexive identity 6 (loi de l"identité reflexive). The ethical system, based on these analyses of the Wissenschaftslehre, thus attempts to construct more specific concepts that embody this process of the human spirit giving finite expression to the infinite. This means deepening the laws of reflection (the thinking of the subject-object structure) by showing how this thought reveals models more and more particular and concrete, which are results of the infinite"s pluralisation.
So, what is at stake in the system of ethics is the question of thinking, thinking which gives rise to concepts that do not merely reproduce the real (as do Nachbilder), but present an aim to be achieved (Vorbilder). That is why Fichte"s deduction of the moral law consists in deducing a thought from the subject-object structure of I-hood. Fichte thus starts out from the intellectual intuition, obtained through a process of abstraction, to end up with a first theorem: "I find myself as willing". This point of departure may seem arbitrary, but in fact, notes Fichte, it "is linked, by means of this deduction, with a foundation of the entire Wissenschaftslehre" 7 . The point of departure is necessary and is in no way an act of faith. We encounter the problem of I-hood that must be thought without contradiction. In this first section of the system of ethics, the I is defined as will, as tendency to spontaneity for spontaneity"s sake ( §1, p. 24-34). But the I is not only object; it is subject-object. As an act, I-hood can be grasped only in the intuition in actuality. The activity of the observed I (or what Fichte calls the I-object, which is "found" at the end of an abstraction) must correspond to the activity of the observing I (we encounter here the process of "Tun und Sagen"). If this were not the case, the activity would no longer be grasped as activity, but rather as the passivity of an object (however, Fichte incurs this risk by using the expression "I find myself"). Thus, if reflexive acting shows up only in action, the mode of cognition of this acting is itself action: hence the necessity, in the second section, of positing knowledge of this "found as willing", hence of positing "the I-subject". We find here Fichte"s method of argumentation used throughout the Wissenschaftslehre in an extremely condensed form:
he deduces what follows from the very positing of the Tathandlung (the object-I of the first paragraph and the Subject-I of the second).
Once he has posited these two aspects, Fichte shows in an argument that I won"t go into here, that from the knowledge of myself as willing (Subject-I from section 2) ensues the consciousness of acting freely according to concepts-not the consciousness of spontaneity for the sake of spontaneity (Object-I from section 1). Consequently, there is a contradiction. When what is objective determines what is subjective, the following law results:
"The content of the derived thought would therefore amount to this: that the intellect has to give itself the unbreakable law of absolute spontaneity" 11 . The law is the expression of necessity on the subjective side. Nevertheless, since this necessity is that of the I and not that of any outside force, it follows that the law is a law that the I gives to itself. result: "What is subjective is the positing of an absolute but completely undetermined power of freedom, as described in the previous section. What is described as objective is determined, produced, and conditioned by this subjective power" 12 . This means that thought is itself possible (with respect to its content as law) only if the I thinks itself free.
Thus, we obtain a synthesis of the idea of law and the idea of freedom, not through some When you think of yourself as free, you are required to think your freedom under a law;
and when you think of this law, you are required to think of yourself as free, for your freedom is presupposed by this law, which announces itself as the law of freedom" 13 .
Freedom is a law for freedom. The moral law is the determination that entails freedom without denying it, that limits it without objectifying it, that crystallizes it without destroying it. The moral law is the only possible thought because it is the only non-contradictory one, non-contradictory in the sense implied by the principle of reflexive non-identity. Through the moral law, the unlimited character of freedom is grasped [apprehended] . The moral law is thus a way of crystallizing the infinite.
12 p. 51 13 p. 55
Through this deduction of the moral law from the intangible principle of reflexive identity, The System of Ethics shows how the moral law is inscribed in the very process of reflection, as it is one of the results of that process. To deduce the moral law is to follow the laws of reflection and to deepen these laws: it is to derive the only mode of thinking that does not blast apart reflexive identity. From this fact, the moral law is no longer a "chimera" or an "occult quality", according to Fichte, but the product of reason that experiments on itself by way of this law; the moral law becomes one of the ways in which reason may express itself. Thus, the moral law is not disassociated from the process of knowing, but is one of its manifestations. Let us now briefly analyze the problems raised for ethics by what we might call "the Nazi common understanding".
a) The Question of Good and Evil
The first problem that a common understanding peculiar to Nazis raises is their total lack
of awareness of what can be called good and evil. Following Kant"s text to the letter, we are forced to acknowledge that such a lack of awareness jeopardizes the reasoning conducted in The Critique of Practical Reason. For Kant reckons that consciousness of the moral law can be separated out "at any time…with every human practical reason"), regardless of the weight of material principles (such as happiness, pleasure or interest).
Eichmann"s understanding (of the law) underscores the frailty of Kant"s induction, for a simple counter-example suffices to invalidate it. Conversely, Kant"s characterization of the law as something verging on a datum also collapses. Thus, as Hannah Arendt has shown, the entire Kantian structure seems infested by the "banality of evil". The same cannot be said of Fichte"s moral philosophy. For, as we have seen, the moral law is not at all imprinted in humanity, like hieroglyphs in stone. Fichte does not portray the reflexive process that leads to the moral law as some sort of return to a pre-given, pre-existing entity (which would be the law), of which we gain consciousness as something always already there. Rather, the law is generated by putting "reflexive agility" into play; that is, it is produced by the actualization of reason. Furthermore, this agility is not understood as a pre-given fact, but rather, it proves to be totally indemonstrable, much like the Tathandlung on which it depends. It is an act and not a fact. Thus, the particular model of reflection that Fichte constructs within speculative philosophy provides a different way of approaching the problem raised for universalist ethics by the existence of the "Nazi common understanding". The model of reflection as Fichte construes it avoids the problem of the moral law"s "naturalization", which is still discernable in certain spots of the second Critique. So, what is required, in the individual case, is literally to apply Fichte"s formula that the human being is essentially (originellement) nothing. Although both Rousseau and Kant insisted upon the perfectibility of humanity, neither one was able to think through all the consequences of this thesis. As can be seen by their shared metaphor of the voice, both were caught up in the idea that the moral law is a fact, a datum imprinted in every individual. If for Fichte, on the contrary, human beings start out as nothing, then he is neither moral nor immoral. Consequently, that man must be conscious of the moral law-for consciousness of the moral law is his vocation-entails neither that he is nor that he will attain this consciousness. To put it more concretely, Eichmann was nothing from the start and did not evolve. So, in Fichte but not in Kant, a lack of awareness of the moral law is conceivable without causing the basis of ethics as founded in reason to weaken in the long run.
b) The Misuse of the Principle of Universalization
The second problem that Eichmann raises for an ethics with universalist claims is his relatively accurate formulation of Kant"s imperative. Kant"s demonstration is once again undermined, for Kant clearly states that the chemistry experiment set up to get around the problem of the noumenon"s inintuitability can be conducted "at any time" and "with every human practical reason" (5:92). Eichmann did indeed perform this chemistry experiment, which means that we can wipe out (push aside) the motives for his actionany inclination or personal interest whatsoever-and programme crime. What is the basis for such an utter misconstrual of the principle of universalisation?
First of all, Eichmann"s statement that he had always acted according to duty has its roots in the following reasoning: if something goes against the inclinations, then it is a sure sign that duty is involved, not pleasure; consequently, it is good. The principle of universalization is totally disembodied and holds as a pure neutral structure taking the form of an "if…then" statement that can be applied mechanically in all cases. The "rationality" implemented is that of automatic application of a general law to particular cases.
That this reasoning is a total misinterpretation of Kant"s work has well been established. when faced with such straying (perversion) of the faculty of judgment, straying that manifests itself as a sort of mechanical repetition of the law. Certainly, in the two systems, the law must be produced by embodied, thinking subjects and not turn into a pure form that is mechanically applied in all circumstances. But we are forced to acknowledge (and Kant has been criticized for this on innumerable occasions) that the purely formal aspect of Kant"s law can lend itself to misinterpretation , it is ambiguous.
The law is actually first defined by abstracting the inclinations, which are contemptible by nature. The terms in which Kant couches this substitute for a proper presentation of the law are also ambiguous. Kant"s evocation of a chemistry experiment and his talk of the universal laws of nature do nothing to discourage the purely calculating rationality and can even give the impression that the universalizing principle possesses an axiological neutrality. On the contrary, it is just these points that Fichte"s moral philosophy avoids. First of all, on the most general level, Fichte"s moral law is not "a pure form", but, as always in his system, it is an agreement between a form and a content. shows that he who declares: "whoever does not believe everything I say is damned for all eternity", "must also find it within himself to add: "But if it isn"t true, then may I myself be damned for all eternity"." Yet, "it is to be hoped that the great majority of them would have doubts about running such a risk; and they could draw from that, that they themselves are not so firmly convinced of their belief so as to wish to impose it on others". ["wer dies alles, was ich euch da sage, nicht glaubt, der ist ewig verdammt; der müsse doch wohl hinzuzusetzen sich getrauen: wenn es aber nicht wahr ist, so will ich selbst ewig verdammt seyn: aber es sey zu hoffen, dass wohl die meisten Bedenken tragen würden, es auf diese Gefahr hin zu wagen; und daraus könnten sie ersehen, dass sie selbst doch nicht so fest von einem Glauben überzeugt seyen, den sie anderen aufdringen wollen."]. The attitude required here is not that of applying a rule to different cases, but rather that of suspending judgment, of hesitating before the most strongly-held beliefs. As P. Naulin has insightfully suggested, it is a matter of transplanting Cartesian doubt into the ethical sphere. When faced with beliefs of an ethical nature, doubt is not just permitted-it is required. Thus, if we analyze the cognitive process suggested by these two moral philosophies, the difference can be expressed as follows: in the first case, application of the law is possible since the terms employed are those of natural necessity.
In the second, the ensuing process is an on-going effort to make one"s belief an object of judgement-effort which presupposes distancing oneself from this belief. Yet that is precisely what Eichmannn is incapable of doing. In fact, it is striking to realize that his line of defence consists purely and simply in proclaiming his nigglingly small intelligence: as he explains to us, he was nothing but "a little man", who had to apply the law and not evaluate it. What Eichmann lacks is thus a certain form of the faculty of judgement which must not consist in applying laws to cases, but rather in distancing oneself/ ( tearing oneself) from contents.
Many other analyses of the Eichmann case could be conducted, but concentration on these two points has helped highlight the concrete effects of Fichte"s refusal to make a sharp division between the theoretical sphere, where judgments can be thought in terms of validity, and the practical sphere, which ultimately is answerable to "faith" or "belief".
If we consider there to be a total separation between the theoretical and practical domains, if we reckon that theoretical speculation has no place whatsoever in the practical domain, then how can we give a concrete explanation of the problem that Eichmann raises? That is, how can we explain the close connection between intelligence and ethics, a connection which, in theory as in practice, bears the name "faculty of 
